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Abstract

The purpose of this research was to identify the current status of the use of the
Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) systems architecture products
within the Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) program offices. There are regulatory
requirements dictating the creation of DoDAF products as annexes to programmatic
documentation, such as the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS)
requirement for systems architectures as annexes for acquisition milestone decision
documentation. In addition, the DoDAF itself identifies several products as being highly
applicable for the development of acquisition strategies. The research issue was to
investigate the use or systems architectures, and particularly the DoDAF products, within
the context of Air Force weapon systems acquisitions, as represented by ASC.
The research indicated two conclusions: while programs required to follow the
new acquisition processes are doing so, very few are employing systems architectures
systematically, and at this point, at least within ASC, the benefits to acquisition program
management personnel derived from an architectural context are not yet being realized.
These conclusions result in several recommendations to ASC, the DoDAF Working
Group, and the systems engineering community in general as to how to make systems
architectures more a way of doing business within Air Force weapon system acquisitions
efforts.
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STATUS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ARCHITECTURE
FRAMEWORK (DoDAF) IMPLEMENTATION WITHIN THE
AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS CENTER (ASC)

1. Introduction
1.1 Background
In February 2004, the Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF)
Volume 1 was released for implementation. This was actually the 3rd version as the
framework intended for all DoD systems acquisitions was expanded from the previously
adopted Command, Control, Communications, and Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Architecture Framework used for the development of
software intensive applications and systems. The framework was part of a larger
Department of Defense (DoD) effort to reinvigorate the systems engineering process
within weapon system development and procurement. The framework presents
suggested formats for the modeling of systems architecture products useful at various
stages of the weapon systems development process.
Systems architecting is not a new concept, having been employed in the
development of software for close to a decade. In 1996, Hilliard, Rice, and Schwarm
defined architecture as: “the highest level conception of a system in its environment” in
a paper attempting to expand the architecture metaphor beyond the software development
realm into the general systems engineering arena (25:1). In 2001, the Defense
Acquisition University (DAU) further defined system architecture as “all the products
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(including the enabling products) that are necessary to support the system and, by
implication, the processes necessary for development, production/construction,
deployment, operations, support, disposal, training, and verification” (13:7).
It has only been since the release of the DoDAF that a formal, specific framework
has been in place for the development of systems architectures for military systems. In
addition to supporting the reemphasis on quality systems engineering within the military,
the DoDAF products also align well with the DoD shift to capabilities-based weapon
system development and the specifically. However, there is always a temptation with a
new tool to attempt to make it all things to all people.
1.2 Research Problem
Acquisition professionals deal with a multitude of regulatory requirements when
it comes to managing an Air Force weapon system program. Depending on the
Acquisition Category, the oversight and guidance may come from the Under Secretary of
the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ). With respect to acquisition program
management, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) (which
replaced the previous ‘Requirements Generation System’) calls for architecture views as
annexes to required programmatic documentation. Further, any system which
communicates with other systems - and it seems hard to imagine systems being
developed in today’s net-centric environment that do not have a requirement to interact
with other systems - is required to include a net-readiness key performance parameter
(NR-KPP) as one of its requirements. Finally, the DoDAF itself identifies several views
for program managers to make use of with respect to acquisition strategy development.
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In terms of formal policy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
(CJCSI) 3170.01, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System Instruction and
CJCSI 6212.01, Interoperability and Supportability of National Security Systems, and
Information Technology Systems directly impact program managers and engineers in
program offices. CJCSI 3170 establishes the policies and procedures for “a joint
concepts-centric capabilities identification process” (8:1,2). JCIDS calls for specific
DoDAF architecture views as annexes to documents such as the Initial Capability
Document (ICD), Capability Development Document (CDD), and Capability Production
Document (CPD) required at each milestone of the development. CJCSI 6212 “details a
methodology to develop interoperability Key Performance Parameters…based on the
format and content of the integrated architecture products described in the most current
version of the DoDAF (17: 2-7).
In addition, the Architecture Framework Working Group (AFWG) identified
eight DoDAF views as “highly applicable” to the development of a successful acquisition
strategy (17:3-12). Although not specifically addressed in policy, these views are
intended to serve as an aid to the program manager in the actual management of the
weapon system program. System program office (SPO) personnel are deluged with
advice and guidance on how best to successfully manage their weapon system acquisition
programs. For example, “acquisition Reform” has been in the program manager’s lexicon
for several years now. Further, recently the emphasis has been on “Transformation” in
all aspects of the DoD, with certain efforts aimed at cycle-time reduction of the weapons
systems the warfighter requires. How are systems architectures, and the DoDAF
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specifically, being implemented “in the trenches” of USAF weapons systems
acquisitions?
1.3 Research Objective
The objective of this study is to examine the state of DoDAF systems architecting
within ASC and make recommendations to improve the DoDAF use for acquisition
program managers. Specifically, the Defense Architecture Working Group is in the early
stages of developing Version 2.0 of the DoDAF and should benefit from
recommendations resulting from an analysis of the current implementation effort at the
program office level. Further, in a November 2004 presentation, the ASC Chief
Architect made the following assertion: “(Wings/Direct Reporting Groups) W/DRGs are
underway in developing an ‘architectural understanding’ and the requisite technologies
for new net enabled capabilities” (43:19). Therefore, as a result of this study, the ASC
Chief Architect will have better insight as how to improve DoDAF implementation
across ASC.
1.4 Thesis Overview
Chapter 2 will provide a definition of systems architecting, a discussion of the
expected benefits of the DoDAF for acquisition program managers, and some potential
pitfalls to implementation at the program office level. The DoDAF is not the first, nor is
it the only, systems architecting framework and Chapter 2 describes two others as well as
the evolution of the DoDAF. The next section introduces the DoDAF views and
summarizes the expected benefits to weapons systems acquisition of implementing the
DoDAF. The final section of Chapter 2 provides an overview of previously identified
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obstacles to using systems architectures, and the DoDAF specifically, for product
development. Chapter 3 describes the data collection and analysis methodology followed
in the completion of this inductive study. The results of data analysis outlined in Chapter
3 are presented in the Findings and Conclusions sections of Chapter 4. Finally,
recommendations for the AFWG and the ASC Chief Architect are presented as well as
potential areas for additional research in Chapter 5.
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2. Literature Review
2.1 Overview
As discussed in the previous chapter, the publication of the DoDAF Version 1.0
in 2004 was not the first foray into systems architecting as part of the overall systems
engineering process. This chapter provides a summary of the relevant literature
pertaining to systems architectures, the DoDAF, and Air Force weapon systems
applications. The systems architecting community is not as vast as one might think.
There are recognized experts who have written extensively as well as a few studies that
look at the process, products, or outcomes of systems architecting. The wide range of
literature in this area is captured below.
First, the need for systems architectures as part of the overall effort to reinvigorate
systems engineering practices within DoD weapon systems development programs is
presented. Following this introduction are several definitions and descriptions of systems
architectures as background. A brief primer on the Zachman framework and the IEEE
Std 1471 is also presented as representative of other architecture frameworks. This leads
to the evolution of the DoDAF from C4ISR Architecture Framework to today with
descriptions of the products and views that make up the framework. Next is a discussion
of the rationale behind using systems architectures, and particularly the DoDAF, in Air
Force weapons systems acquisitions, presenting both general as well as regulatory
guidance. Finally, recent information concerning the application of the DoDAF in
weapons systems acquisitions is presented with an emphasis on the 2003 Air Force
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Inspection Agency (AFIA) Eagle Look report on architecture-based acquisitions. The
Eagle Look report will lead into the final section of this chapter, which deals with
roadblocks or issues with using system architectures within Air Force weapon systems
acquisition efforts that have been previously identified.
2.2 Systems Architectures as Part of Systems Engineering
In February 2004, Michael Wynne, acting Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition Technology and Logistics (AT&L), issued a policy letter intended to begin
the process of reinvigorating systems engineering (SE) within DoD weapon systems
acquisitions. Mr. Wynne stated the importance of rigorous systems engineering
discipline in order to develop and maintain needed warfighting capability. Specifically,
the letter called for:
All programs responding to a capabilities or requirements
document, regardless of acquisition category, shall apply
a robust SE approach that balances total system performance
and total ownership costs within the family-of-systems,
systems-of-systems context.
He went on to say, “collectively these actions will reinvigorate our acquisition
community…thus assuring affordable, supportable, and above all, capable solutions for
the warfighter” (44:1).
This emphasis on systems engineering was echoed at the Air Force level in
comments made previously by both the Secretary of the Air Force Dr. James Roche and
further by the Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition Dr. Marvin Sambur. In a 24
June 2002 Air Force Times article, Dr. Roche stated in response to questions dealing with
issues relating to recent Air Force acquisition program budget and schedule breaches,
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“Increasingly, I’m convinced that the systemic problem is in the field of systems
engineering” (10:3 ). In his 9 April 2003 memo “Incentivizing Contractors for Better
Systems Engineering”, Dr. Sambur said, “An immediate transformation imperative for all
programs is to focus on the application of systems engineering principles and practices
throughout the system life cycle” (40:4). One systems engineering practice looked at to
help in this reinvigoration is systems architecting.
An underlying rationale behind the Air Force’s insistence on improved systems
engineering, is the increasing level of complexity inherent in current weapons systems
development, an issue with inherent systems engineering implications. Systems
architectures offer a tool to deal with this issue. In a systems architecture tutorial
presented at the 2004 National Defense Industrial Associates (NDIA) Systems
Engineering Conference, presenters from Kasse Initiatives, LLC stated: “Generating a
system architecture as part of the systems engineering process can be seen as a deliberate
approach to deal with the uncertainty that characterizes these complex, unprecedented
systems” (26:6). Further, Howard Eisner offers the following in his book, Essentials of
Project and Systems Engineering Management, “Architecting a large-scale complex
system is the centerpiece of systems engineering” (20:348). Hilliard, Rice, and Schwarm
go so far as to offer the architectural metaphor as an appropriate foundation for the
systems engineering field as opposed to grounding systems engineering in other
disciplines, ranging from set theory to systems theory to category theory to psychology
(25:1).
Whether foundational or not, “the current interest in architecture is motivated by
the desire to build our systems ‘faster, better, and cheaper’” (25:1). “Faster, better, and
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cheaper” has been a weapons systems development goal for years, with systems
engineering being the methodology for converting requirements into systems through the
DoD acquisition process. “The system engineering effort is integrated into the systems
acquisition process such that the activities associated with systems engineering support
and strengthen the acquisition process” (13:23). Just as systems engineering integrates
with the acquisition process, “systems architecting is an essential part of the system
engineering process and relies on many of the methodologies that have been developed
over time” (19:41). As with any entity, multiple perspectives have developed over time.
These perspectives are, in some way, captured in the multiple definitions of systems
architecture in the literature.
2.3 Systems Architectures and Frameworks Defined
There are a number of definitions of what an architecture is in a systems context.
Beyond the numerous definitions, there are several frameworks for systems architectures;
these include the Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework, The Open Group
Architecture Framework, the IEEE 1471 Standard, the Zachman Framework, and the
DoDAF. Each of these frameworks has its own definition of system architecture as well
in addition to recommended format for products. The similarities and distinctions
between these different definitions are worth noting. Irrespective of the differences in
these definitions, the bottom line is that for Air Force weapon system acquisitions, the
definition and framework that applies most is the DoDAF.
Beyond the three frameworks mentioned above, there are other widely accepted
definitions of system architectures. Dr. Mark Maier, author of The Art of Systems
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Architecting, has a high-level conception of systems architectures and defines the process
of architecting as “the art and science of developing systems solutions in ill-structured
problem environments” (2:1). Further, he believes “the concrete, deliverable products of
the architect, therefore, are models (or abstracted designs) of the system” (33:18,139).
This high-level perspective is shared by Hilliard et. al., who stated: “Systems are situated
in their environments. An architecture reflects the whole system in response to that
environment” (25:1).
NASA’s definition deals with functions and their interactions: “How functions
are grouped together and interact with each other. Applies to the mission and to both
inter- and intra-system, segment, element, and subsystem” (20:249). The Defense
Acquisition University has the following definition that seems all-inclusive:
The System Architecture identifies all the products
(including enabling products) that are necessary to
support the system and, by implication, the processes
necessary for development, production/construction,
deployment, operations, support, disposal, training, and
verification. (13:7)

Other definitions deal with architectures role in the design of the system. Howard
Eisner, author of Essentials of Project and Systems Engineering Management, believes
architecting is “fundamentally a design or synthesis process” and defines architecture as
“an organized top-down selection and description of design choices for all the important
system functions and subfunctions, placed in a context to assure interoperability and the
satisfaction of system requirements” (20:347,273). In his book, The Engineering Design
of Systems Models and Methods, Dennis Buede defines an operational architecture as
providing
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A complete description of the system design, including
the functional architecture allocated to the physical
architecture, derived input/output, technology and systemwide, trade off, and qualification requirements for each
component… and complete documentation of the design
and major design decisions. (6:246)

Finally, Lawrence McCaskill believes the Federal Chief Information Officer Council’s
definition is clearer regarding what architectures are, and their intended use:
A strategic information asset base, which defines the
mission, the information necessary to perform the mission
and the technologies necessary to perform the mission, and
the transitional processes for implementing new
technologies in response to the changing mission needs.
(37:3)

These definitions, however distinct, all present an architecture as a representation
of a system that facilitates the transition from user/customer concept to actual hardware
or software implementation. Whether high-level and abstract or extremely detailed and
technical, the point is still the same: communicate the requirements, design, and
constraints involved with the development of the system. Hilliard et. al. sum it up: “An
effective architecture shows how to build a system to satisfy clients’ needs, in the context
of that client’s goals and vision” (25:3). In order to achieve some consensus, frameworks
have been developed to provide some structure to the architecting process.
Three frameworks for architectural representation include the Zachman Enterprise
Architecture Framework, the IEEE 1471 Standard, and the DoDAF. John Zachman
created and published a Framework for Enterprise Architecture in 1987 and extended it
for broader applications in 1992 (45:5). IEEE Std 1471-2000 IEEE Recommended
Practice for Architectural Description of Software-Intensive Systems was published in
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October 2000 following five years of development. And “in the early 1990s the DoD
undertook the development of an architecture framework for Command, Control,
Communications, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)
systems” (33:223) which has evolved into the DoDAF.
The Zachman Framework.
In his article, “Architecture, Enterprise Architecture, Frameworks, and
Processes”, Kevin Kreitman describes the Zachman framework as “perhaps the oldest
and most extensive framework in use today” (27:12). The Zachman framework consists
of six categories along the horizontal axis (data, function, network, people, time, and
motivation) and five categories along the vertical axis (scope, business model, system
model, technology model, and detailed representations). Although designed for
enterprise applications such as reengineering, David Brown wrote in the Spring 2000
Acquisition Review Quarterly that “the Zachman framework provides an excellent
template for developing the architecture of just about anything” (5:125). Further, in
Brown, Zachman defines architecture as “that set of design artifacts, or descriptive
representations, that are relevant for describing an object such that it can be produced to
requirements as well as maintained over the period of its useful life” (5:122). Brown also
believes “the Zachman framework can make important contributions to acquisition
reform” (5:125).
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IEEE Standard 1471.
“In April 1995 the IEEE Software Engineering Standards Committee (SESC)
convened an Architecture Planning Group (APG) to study the development of an
architecture standard for software-intensive systems”. Their final report was presented in
1996, followed by the IEEE Architecture Working Group holding bi-monthly meetings
from 1996 to 1999 (24:4). This resulted in the publication of IEEE 1471 Standard 1471 –
2000, Recommended Practice for Architectural Description of Software-Intensive
Systems in 2000. “IEEE 1471 establishes a set of content requirements on an
architectural description – a collection of products to document an architecture” (23:1).
The IEEE Definition of architecture, “the highest level (essential, unifying) concept of a
system in its environment” (22:4), however vague, is still considered by many the
archetypical definition. Mark Maier offers the following critique of the 1471 effort:
The 1471 project was intended to codify the areas of
Community consensus on architecture description. In
the end , consensus only developed around a framework
of views and viewpoints and an organizing structure for
architecture descriptions, but there was no prescription of
any particular views. (33:230)

Even before the publication of the standard, Hilliard, Rice, and Schwarm offered a
proposal in 1996 to extend the architectural metaphor beyond software engineering to the
field of systems engineering in general.

13

The Evolution of the DoDAF.
It is this broadening of perspective that characterizes the evolution of the DoDAF
from a software and C4ISR-intensive system framework to one that applies now to all
weapon systems development. As Maier recounts:
In the early 1990s the DoD undertook the development of
an architecture framework for Command, Control,
Communications, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. The stated goal for
this project was to improve interoperability across
commands, services, and agencies by standardizing how
architectures of C4ISR systems are represented. (33:223)
The Architecture Working Group (AWG) published version 1.0 in June 1996 and version
2.0 in December 1997; version 2.0 is commonly referred to as the C4ISR Architecture
Framework (CAF) (33:223-224). An early 1998 Joint Staff memorandum mandated the
CAF for all C4ISR architecture descriptions (17:1-6).
The DoD broadened the application of the framework beyond C4ISR systems
based on the utility of the CAF and both Federal (Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, etc.) and
DoD policy encouraging the use of architectures (17:1-6). The result was the publication
in 2004 of the DoDAF Version 1.0 Volumes I and II. The stated purpose of the DoDAF
Version 1.0, is “to provide guidance for describing architectures for both warfighting
operations and business operations and processes” (17:1-1). DoDAF Volume I defines
architecture as: “the structure of components, their relationships, and the principles and
guidelines governing their design and evolution over time” (17:1-1). Even though the
ASC Chief Architect defined architecture in his November 2004 presentation on Network
Enabled Warfare, as “a systematic, rigorous, reproducible methodology for capturing,
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organizing and communicating data about complex systems to support analysis” (43:29),
the DoDAF definition is the one used and implied throughout this study.
Description of the DoDAF.
The DoDAF consists of multiple products known as views. There are four types
of views, the All Views, Operational Views, Systems Views, and Technical Standards
Views. Several of these views are collected in what is called an “integrated architecture”
referred to extensively in the JCIDS documentation. These are the architecture products
referred to throughout this research effort.
DoDAF Volume Two defines architecture products as:
Those graphical, textual, and tabular items that are
developed in the course of gathering architecture data,
identifying their composition into related architecture
components or composites, and modeling the
relationships among those composites to describe
characteristics pertinent to the architecture’s intended
use. (18, 2004:1-1)
Thus, architecture products can take the form of Power Point charts, Excel spreadsheets,
tables and charts, as well as any other graphical product that conforms to the standard
above. The DoDAF is careful not to specify a certain development methodology. In
fact, it is purposely intended to be methodology independent (12).
There are four categories of views within the DoDAF: the Overview and
Summary, Operational, Systems, and Technical Standards Views. The All Views
category captures essential overview information about the architecture.
The Overview and Summary (AV-1) is essential for
documenting the assumptions, constraints, and limitations
that may affect high-level decision processes involving…
architecture. AV-1 also identifies the approving authority,
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the completion date, and records level of effort and costs
required to develop the architecture as well as the time
frame covered and the organizations that fall within the
scope of the architecture. (17:3-10)

“The Operational View (OV) describes the tasks and activities necessary to successfully
perform the mission, the participating nodes, and the associated information exchanges”
(17:3-2). Further, “OV descriptions are useful for…defining the operational
requirements to be supported by resources and systems” and “a pure OV is materiel
independent” (17:3-2). In order to deliver a weapon system, the tasks and activities
modeled in the OVs are allocated to systems, which are themselves modeled in Systems
Views. “The Systems View (SV) describes the systems of concern and the connections
among those systems in context with the OV” (17:3-3). Finally, “the Technical
Standards View (TV) describes a profile of the minimum set of time-phased standards
and rules governing the implementation, arrangement, interaction, and interdependence
of systems” (17:3-4). The DoDAF defines an integrated architecture (a term used
throughout JCIDS and other documents) as the AV-1, AV-2, OV-2, OV-3, OV-5, SV-1,
and TV-1, at a minimum) (17:1-5). The 26 views are summarized in Figure 1.
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Figure 1 DoDAF Views
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(DoDAF, 2004)

2.4 The DoDAF and Air Force Weapon System Acquisition
The views mentioned above are intended to aid the weapon system designer in
translating requirements into capability to the warfighter. Weapon systems design and
development is the purview of program managers and engineers within Air Force
acquisition program offices. Beyond the notional benefits to systems engineering, the
DoDAF Working Group prescribed several views as beneficial to the program manager
in acquisition strategy development. Further, as Zinn noted, with the Clinger-Cohen Act
and Office of Management and Budget circular A-130, “the use of architectures had not
only been recommended but essentially made law” (46:17), at least for information
technology systems. In addition, JCIDS, NR-KPP, and Information Support Plan
guidance calls for the production of systems architecture products as well. These are
requirements program office personnel must meet.
The most basic task the acquisition program manager has, albeit far from a trivial
one, is to translate operational requirements into a contractual specification that will
result in the development of a system meeting the user’s needs. This is the core
capability systems engineering efforts provide. Systems engineering has become more
and more complicated as the level of complexity of the systems under development
increases as well as the requirements for these systems to interact also increase.
Therefore, “the architectural approach is needed most as systems become more complex
and multi-disciplinary, and for systems customized to individual clients” (3:1). The
DoDAF Working Group stated:
Using an integrated architecture ensures that the system to
be acquired is addressed in the context of a whole
environment rather than a separate entity. The architecture
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can support identification of operational dependencies
outside the sphere of the specific system under
development. (17:3-21)
Further In a 2002 paper, Dr, Harry Crisp related how systems architectures can
aid in this effort, stating: “Architectures provide the framework for FoS/SoS (Federation
of Systems/Systems of Systems) systems engineering and acquisition”, a feeling echoed
by Dr. Steven Long (see Figure 2 below) as well as the Air Force Chief Architect, Dr.
Alexander Levis (12:86). This belief is further outlined in the Architecture Playbook
developed by the Enterprise Integration Forum Architecture Process Team as a guide for
the use of systems architectures: “an architecture-based approach can provide a formal
methodology and associated language for determining and representing similar
information about complex system (system-of-systems) and relationship to their
environments” (19:1).
Systems architectures are another tool in the program office tool box that, when
combined in an overall management and execution effort, can lead to success:
Together, integrated architectures, executable
architectures, analytical tools and methods render
quantitative actionable information, which, in turns
supports funding decisions, acquisitions, system
engineering, and investment decisions. (39:11)
Architectures are also a tool designed to aid in program management. Program managers
“need to be able to analyze these architectures to locate, identify, and resolve definitions,
properties, facts, constraints, inferences, and issues both within and across architectural
boundaries that are redundant, conflicting, missing, and/or obsolete” (39:3). In fact, this
tool can be considered necessary, “creating a system’s C4ISR/DoDAF architecture is one
of several necessary activities to advance from a mission concept to reality” (32:10).
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Figure 2 Architectures as Part of Development Process (Long, 2004)

In DoDAF Volume I, the DoDAF Working Group identifies eight views as
“highly applicable” to the development of a weapon system acquisition strategy.
Systems architecting can be very useful in this early stage of the development effort.
The role of systems architecting in the systems acquisition
process depends upon the phase of that process. It is
strongest during conceptualization and certification, but
never absent. Omitting it at any point, as with any part of
the acquisition process, leads to predictable errors of
omission at that point to those connected with it. (33:23)

Figure 3 depicts the “Recommended Uses for Architectures” as identified by the DoDAF
Working Group. Notice, under ‘Acquisition Process’, the first line is Acquisition
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Strategy. There are eight views that are highlighted as “highly applicable” with another
three as “often or partially applicable”. In addition to these, Levis describes Dickerson
and Soules’ proposal for the following products as useful for acquisition strategy
development: SV-8, SV-9, TV-2, and CV-6 (Capability Views never implemented in
DoDAF) (31:5-62).

Figure 3 Recommended Uses of Architecture

(DoDAF, 2004)

Figure 3 also highlights the JCIDS systems architecture requirements. Notice that
the views under the JCIDS header are not only “highly applicable”, but are also
“specifically addressed in policy”; in this case CJCSI 3170. In addition, DoD Instruction
“Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,” May 12, 2003 “defines how integrated
architectures are to be used in the requirements and acquisition processes” (17:2-5).
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“JCIDS implements a capabilities-based approach that better leverages the expertise of
all government agencies, industry and academia to identify improvements to existing
capabilities and to develop new warfighting capabilities” (7:A-1). In fact, the assumption
that “integrated architectures are the preferred method for describing operational,
technical and systems interactions and assessing future capability needs” has been an
underlying theme for the revised JCIDS documented in CJCSI 3170.01D (35:3).
Program managers attempt to get their system through the acquisition milestones
to full production and sustainment. In order to accomplish this, they are required to
produce the appropriate documentation at each milestone review. “Integrated
architecture products must be included in mandatory appendixes for the ICD, CDD, and
CPD” (17:2-7). Further, mandatory integrated architecture products for CRDs (Capstone
Requirements Documents) include AV-1, OV-2, OV-4, OV-5, OV-6C, SV-4, and SV-6
(8:E-A-6).
In addition to the JCIDS requirements, architectures are also required
documentation for Information Support Plans (ISPs – formerly C4I Support Plans) and as
part of the documentation required to identify net-ready key performance parameters
(NR-KPP). Both Figures 3 and 4 (below) identify the architecture views required for
ISP/C4ISP development. According to Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
(CJCSI) 6212.01C, “all CDDs (Capability Development Documents) that exchange
information will have a NR-KPP” which is “derived from a completed architecture and
developed from” mandatory architecture products (see Figure 4 below) (9:F-1). In fact,
the instruction goes on to say “development of the NR-KPP begins with designing the
architecture for the proposed system” (9:F-2).
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Figure 4 JCIDS Documents/NR-KPP Products Matrix (CJCSI, 2003)

National Security Space (NSS) Acquisition Policy guidance is provided in NSS
Acquisition Policy 03-01 and, although separate and distinct from the more general
weapon systems acquisition guidance in the DoD 5000 series, emphasizes the use of
systems architecture products. “It is the responsibility of JCIDS and National Security
Space Architect’s (NSSA) processes to develop integrated architectures and initial
operational view (OV) products for NSS systems” (42:10). Further, conducting system
architecture development efforts and producing initial SV and TV architecture products
is included in phase readiness review and entry criteria checklists (42: 35). Systems
architectures are therefore pervading all aspects of DoD weapon systems development.
In a presentation before the Software Technology Council in 2003, Thilenius and
others presented the following statistic highlighting the increased role architectures are
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playing in weapon system acquisition: “Architecture products directly responsible for
$1.17B in O3 POM” (41:26). Therefore, as the Air Force, and indeed all of DoD moves
to a more capability-based development process, systems architectures will continue to
be prevalent. This fact is highlighted by the increased interest in how architectures
should integrate in the weapon system acquisition process.
In September 2003, the Air Force Inspection Agency published its findings during
an Eagle Look investigation into architecture-based acquisition. Submitted by the
Electronic Systems Center, the purpose statement was to “assess the ability of the Air
Force to integrate enterprise architecting into the acquisition process by identifying
policy strengths and shortfalls, as well as enablers and impediments to integration” (2:no
page). The Eagle Look team interviewed key individuals involved with architectures
from the following types of organizations (113 interviews, predominantly senior leaders
– 70% were in the grade of Lt Col or higher for military and GS-15 and above for
government civilians): Secretary of the Air Force and Headquarters United States Air
Force Functional Offices, Unified and Major Commands, Product Centers and Product
Groups, and Department of Defense (DoD) Functionals and Program Offices. The team
found that “94% of the personnel in, or involved with, the acquisition process consider
architectures (both warfighting and business) to be of significant value in improving how
products or systems are acquired and sustained” (2:no page).
2.5 Roadblocks to DoDAF Implementation Within Air Force Product Centers
In addition to the positive perceptions with respect to system architectures in
acquisitions, the EAGLE LOOK team also identified several areas of concern. There are
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others experienced in systems architectures that have also recognized potential
roadblocks to the successful implementation of systems architectures within Air Force
weapon systems acquisitions. At the 2004 Command and Control Research and
Technology Symposium, Lawrence McCaskill offered his analysis of the DoDAF and its
implementation. Beyond the use of the DoDAF products, there are concerns about the
views themselves. One of the recurring critiques of systems architectures is their static
nature, leading to the call for executable architectures. Finally, there is a danger in
program office personnel creating architectures for architecture sake.
AFIA EAGLE LOOK.
Interviewees responding to the 2003 AFIA Eagle Look investigation identified
the following issues to be addressed in order to move to an acquisition system driven by
architectures (see Table 1).
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Table 1 EAGLE LOOK Issues
Issues
Leadership may not sustain the focus needed to fully implement the architecture
construct.
A significant portion of the workforce was unconvinced that architectures are a
valuable construct to pursue.
Policy and guidance to implement an architecture-based acquisition process was
insufficient.
Organizationally- or functionally-centric, or ‘stovepiped’ processes will impede
the move to an enterprise architecture-based system.
Full integration of enterprise architecting into key Air Force and DoD processes,
such as the CRRA (capabilities review and risk analysis) and the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes, has not occurred.
Air Force personnel lacked the needed education, training, and experience to
effectively pursue enterprise architecting.
Funding strategy was insufficient to accomplish this task
(AFIA, 2003)

In addition, “the EAGLE LOOK team identified workforce attitude as a potential
impediment to integrating architecture concepts into the acquisition business”, which is
not surprising seeing as the team also found “the Air Force does not include architectural
development skills as a core skill set for program managers” (2:16, 41).
Many EAGLE LOOK interviewees felt architectures were too information
technology-centric, with one respondent stating “(Architecture) policy…doesn’t apply to
weapon systems” (2:16, 67). This latter feeling is echoed in the fact that the only
mention of systems architecture products in the Interim Guidance Preceding Air Force
Instruction 63-101, Capabilities Based Acquisition System is in the section outlining
information technology as an important management consideration (14:20). And finally,
with respect to the integrated architectures JCIDS refers to, “none of the overarching
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joint operational architectures are in place, so the Services continue to do what they’ve
always done” (2:36).
McCaskill’s Study.
Lawrence McCaskill, an employee of Whitney, Bradley, & Brown, Inc.,
presented a paper, “Integrated DoD/C4ISR Architectures: It’s not About the
Framework…”, for the 2004 Command and Control Research and Technology
Symposium in which he identified several concerns with the way architectures were
being used. His study set out to “clarify the overarching purpose of integrated
architectures…and describe a methodology by which the architecture community can
improve the process of developing and maintaining architectures” (37:1).
With respect to the CRRA integration issue identified in the EAGLE LOOK
report, McCaskill found that due to architectures not having complete financial and
scheduling information, architecture-based analysis in the CRRA “requires lots of
manual processes to put together” (37:17). Referring to acquisition program office
personnel reactions to the requirement for architecture products, McCaskill stated: “This
process put the architectures at the wrong end of the acquisition chain; the architectures
didn’t drive the requirements to create the respective systems – they ended up being the
product of the system being built (and often, an afterthought, after the system had already
been built)” (37:9). Ultimately, McCaskill found “current efforts, especially with regard
to C4ISPs/ISPs are ‘reinventing the wheel’ every time one of these requirements
documents is created, thus creating semantic mismatches for the same information, and in
the endgame, misusing resources” (37:16).

27

Issues With the Products Themselves.
Despite the fact that the DoDAF has been embraced by the DoD as the best tool
to add discipline, structure, and context to our new and modernized systems, there are
some issues with the products used to represent the architecture. There are issues with
their comprehensive applicability or effectiveness for acquisition management,
capability-based analysis, and systems engineering applications. The United Kingdom
(UK) is developing its own architecture framework, in part, to address deficiencies it sees
in the DoDAF. Members of the Joint Staff, specifically the J-8, have also expressed
doubts concerning the utility of system architecture products for the capability-based
analysis and decision-making they perform. Another issue with the products themselves
involves the ability to measure the level of functionality or capability identified in the
architecture.
Hilliard et. al. questions how complete the DoDAF products are with respect to
the types of analysis they are intended to aid.
It is tempting to prescribe predefined views (as the
DoDAF does), “however, we do not yet have enough
experience to prescribe these, or any, views for all
systems. Sometimes, a system’s most critical architectural
concerns fall outside this familiar set. (25:4)
Further, Dam and Long unearthed another issue with the completeness of the DoDAF
architecture products. In terms of comparison, there is no standard set of levels; for
instance, how do I know I am at the same level of OV when looking at 2 architectures
(12)? And, in terms of engineering, Long, Macdonald, and Maley concur with the notion
the DoDAF is less than complete, believing additional detail beyond that required to
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generate the views is needed. “Otherwise, the team performs ‘engineering by viewgraph’
which is well known as an inadequate approach for the design of complex systems”
(32:3).
Maier has stated the following in terms of the systems engineering aspects of
weapon systems acquisition:
One clear issue is that it (CAF) is often being used for
purposes for which it was not intended. The goals, at least
as discussed in the CAF documentation, did not include
defining a standard that was complete with respect to an
acquirer’s concerns. For example, there is no place in the
views for performance models, cost models, or other
management models. Yet all those are clearly necessary
when the client is an acquirer and must make acquisition
decisions. (33:226)
With respect to making acquisition decisions, the DoDAF has not improved upon this
deficiency. As such, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) is working on its
own standard, the Ministry of Defense Architecture Framework (MoDAF). The MoDAF
builds on to the DoDAF with 12 additional views, including two new categories of
views; Capability and Acquisition Views. These additional views are intended “to
handle temporal and other procurement aspects where the DoDAF…doesn’t cover these
aspects” (36: M-5). The ultimate goal is to develop “a common language set to describe
systems and systems-of-systems” and obtain a “context for system procurement” not
previously achievable (36:M-3). Even though the intent of the DoDAF is to bring
interoperability, consistency and cohesiveness to the development of new capabilities, the
products from these tools impose an additional data and semantic interface that the
requirements engineering and systems engineering teams must resolve” (32:3).
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In a 17 May 2004 presentation outlining concerns the J-8 Staff has with integrated
architectures US Navy Captain Mike Mara declared architectures to be resourceintensive and not as valuable as hoped as planning and decision-making aids. He said,
“Architectures tend to be brittle, static at best, or worse, outdated. DoDAF architectures
require significant fiscal and manpower resources to produce” and “architectures can not
be produced or revised on a timeline that matches the tempo of analytic questions facing
decision makers” (35:4). In terms of utility and value, Mara said, “Most of the DODAF
architecture views are not necessary to conduct capability-based assessments and do not
include data needed to support this process. Additionally, no architecture views capture
the robust relationships between capabilities, attributes and metrics needed for capabilitybased assessments” (35:4). These beliefs have lead the J-8 to the conclusion that they
“no longer assert that architecture is the preferred method” to “evaluate how well a
system or system-of-systems attains a desired capability” (35:5).
An additional concern with the DoDAF products is their inability to provide
information on the level of capability or effectiveness of the architecture modeled. Mara
also recognized this deficiency in a 2003 paper,
The framework only show(s) a binary relationship between
systems and operational activities – a system either has the
functionality or it doesn’t. In reality, there needs to be
recognition and some assessment of how much functionality a
system has”. (34:9)
McCaskill also noted architecture’s inability to provide measures of effectiveness:
While this answers the ‘first order’ question of ‘is there a
system being developed that answers the requirements of
the capability,’ it does not answer the question of ‘how
effective’ the FoS/SoS is in accomplishing this capability.
Thus, this only provides the ‘first step’ towards the
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analysis that the decision-maker will need to make
acquisition decisions” (37:14).

Executable Architectures.
One way to answer the ‘how effective’ question McCaskill brings up above is to
run an executable model of the architecture and analyze the system/capability
performance. However, the DoDAF does not include an executable architecture among
its products: “There are currently no standards for the format or process for constructing
executable architectures” (17: 7-2). Issues of timing and latency, as well as outcome
measures of effectiveness could be addressed with the development of executable
architectures.
The need for executable architectures lies in the static nature of the DoDAF
products. “Static operational models only show that activities ‘must be capable of’
producing and consuming information. They do not provide details on how or under
what input/output conditions information is actually produced/consumed” (39: 8). In
another paper, Ring and others concluded: “These static products…fail to provide a good
vehicle for conducting detailed dynamic ‘behavioral’ analysis of how the systems are
supposed to interact with each other” (17:3). James Long describes the need for
executable models as: “Static diagrams may or may not actually work, since in reality
many of the processes interact with one another and functional decomposition can miss
critical interfaces” and “simulation enables the execution of these models, thus ensuring
that the design is executable (i.e., will work)” (12:125). And, in his thesis dealing with
the implementation of a specific architecture, Capt Gregory DeStefano noted that despite
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the dynamic behavior captured in some of the DoDAF views (in particular the OV-6),
“some vehicle is needed to take these products and put them into motion” (15:2-14).
Although the DoDAF does not include formats or processes for executable
architectures, it does define what they are. DoDAF Volume I defines executable
architecture as “the use of dynamic simulation software to evaluate architectural models”
(17:7-1). These executable architectures would provide value to acquisition program
office personnel, as stated by the Enterprise Integration Forum Architecture Process
Team:
The derivation of an executable model of the architecture
from the three views and the associated integrated
dictionary, provides a basis for understanding the
interrelationships among the various architecture
products and establishes the foundation for
implementing a process for assessing and
comparing architecture. (19:41)

There are efforts underway to address this issue and develop or improve existing discrete
event simulators to have the capability to perform dynamic analysis of the capability or
system under development. In a recent Air Force Institute of Technology thesis, it was
shown that the DoDAF architectures provide all the information required for any
modeling and simulation required to analyze competing design decisions (46:91).
However, at this point there are no well accepted methods for a program office engineer
to execute an architecture.
Architecting for Architectures Sake
Irrespective of the issues with systems architecting as a systems engineering tool
or with the DoDAF and its views, there is also the issue that the architecture becomes the
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focus, as evidenced in the following caution from Jeffrey Harris, former Director of the
National Reconnaissance Office:
Recent years have increased the focus on architectures…
While (this) is beneficial, it is easy to allow the architecture
and its processes to become the focus rather than the users’
desired effects”. (21:47)

The DoDAF Deskbook attempts to head off this issue by providing a notional six-step
process that includes four steps before any architecture products are actually built (see
Figure 5 below).

Figure 5 Architecture Development Process (DoDAF Deskbook)
Further, McCaskill also cautions that “while the Framework plays a large part in
providing a common lexicon by which the primitives that compose integrated
architectures are described, delving directly into ‘spreadsheets and boxologies’ misses
the point of why we’re creating integrated architectures” (37:3). It would be a shame for
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those earnestly working on systems architectures in an effort to improve their systems
engineering rigor, to lose focus on the reason for the system architecture and indeed the
systems engineering work at all.
System architecture products are required by direction for Air Force weapon
systems acquisition efforts. The JCIDS process identifies capability requirements that
evolve into the weapon systems that are developed in Air Force Materiel Command
product centers. These product centers employ program managers and engineers skilled
in taking a user’s requirement and turning it into a hardware or software solutions, that is
systems engineering. The DoDAF provides a framework for capturing the early systems
engineering work performed and communicating the complex interactions of the system
or capability under development. However, the DoDAF has not yet been universally
accepted as a systems engineering tool and practice. There are several obstacles to the
full implementation of a systems architecture mentality within the trenches of Air Force
weapon systems acquisition.
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3. Data Collection and Analysis Methodology
3.1 Overview
Chapter 2 summarized the literature supporting the notion that systems
architectures are useful and valuable for Air Force weapon systems acquisitions.
However, there were also several issues or roadblocks identified. Chapter 3 lays out the
methodology for investigating the level to which these obstacles have been overcome (at
least within ASC). This study is inductive in nature, relying on interviews with “people
in the know” and critical analysis of the results. First, the “people in the know” had to be
identified – the population from which to collect data. Then, the data was collected via
structured interviews. This data was collated and formatted for analysis of the results.
This analysis involved grouping respondents by their level of DoDAF implementation.
Along the way, significant additional information concerning systems architecting, the
DoDAF, capabilities-based system development, and even the new ASC organizational
structure was also collected.
3.2 Research Design
This is a qualitative case study of the implementation of system architectures,
specifically the DoDAF, within ASC. Whereas the 2003 AFIA Eagle Look, described in
Chapter 2, took a broad brush look at architectures in acquisition across the Air Force at a
senior leader level, the focus here is collecting detailed information to determine the level
to which the DoDAF has permeated throughout ASC to the program manager and
engineer level. Data was collected through interviews (and in rare cases e-mail
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correspondence) with personnel representing the highest level of acquisition program
management execution. These interviews lead to follow-up interviews with specific
program personnel within each Wing or DRG. In total, 39 interviews were conducted.
3.3 Data Collection Methodology
The data collected through these interviews was intended to provide a
characterization of the level of system architecture work previously done, currently
ongoing, or planned. The questions posed during the interviews gathered information as
to rationales behind decisions concerning architecture efforts within each organization.
In addition, data was collected concerning the level of education, training, and general
familiarity in systems architectures each person interviewed possessed. In total, this data
would be collated by program and then by Wing or DRG in order to portray an overall
picture of systems architecting within ASC as a whole.
The interviews generally took no more than 30 minutes and were facilitated by a
standard note-taker template. Access to the interviewees was made possible through the
ASC Commander’s Action Group and through personal connections with the Wing and
DRG Executive Officers. Each interviewee was assured that their individual identities
would not be revealed. Confidentiality is accomplished by reporting the responses tied to
organizations rather than specific persons or even job titles.
Although no two interviews were exactly the same, the same basic questions were
asked to all interviewees. Example questions included:
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- Does your organization (Wing/DRG/Program, depending on the level of
authority of the person being interviewed) make use of the DoDAF systems
architecture framework/process?
- If yes;
-- To what degree do you make use of the architecture products during the
execution and management of your program?
-- Which views are more/less useful to you in executing your program?
-- Who creates the views; in-house (program office personnel and
contractors), outside contractor support, the user (Major Command)?
-- How much training or education do the people creating and reviewing
the architecture views have in the DoDAF and systems architecting, in
general?
-- What tools do you use to create the systems architecture views (Popkin,
Visio, Power Point, etc.)?
- If no;
-- Why not? What is keeping your organization from adopting this
framework?
-- Does your organization employ another systems architecture
framework (IEEE 1471, Zachman, etc.)?
-- Do you have another method for capturing the output of your systems
engineering processes?
- How could systems architecting, and specifically the DoDAF, be more useful to
you?
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The population for this study was selected in order to best meet the research
objective. ASC provided a population experiencing the expansion of the role of the
DoDAF. The DoDAF is expanding the realm of systems architecting from C4ISR
systems to all systems. As such, studying the implementation at the Aeronautical
Systems Center seemed appropriate. The level of acceptance and use within ASC should
serve as a barometer for overall acceptance of the DoDAF within Air Force weapon
systems acquisition programs, which traditionally have not been dominated by networked
C4ISR capabilities.
ASC was undergoing a significant reorganization. In June 2004, ASC began
operating under a wing, group, and squadron structure. Over 40 separate program offices
were organized into five acquisition systems wings and two direct reporting groups for
fighter attack, long range strike, reconnaissance, mobility, agile combat support, special
operations forces and training aircraft. In January 2005, the structure was formally
recognized (1:2). The new structure is depicted in Figure 6. ASC was the first product
center to operationalize this reorganization with all the others soon to follow.
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Within ASC, interviews were performed at various levels. The first interviews
were with members of the ASC Commander’s Action Group (CAG). The CAG is
responsible for being the liaison between the Wings and DRGs and the Commander.
They review documentation and generally make sure both the Commander is informed
about the Wings/DRGs and the Wings/DRGs are informed about the concerns of the
Commander. The CAG was chose first in order to get an overall picture of the
Commander’s requirements with respect to systems architecture. For instance, does the
Commander review the systems architecture products included in the programmatic
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documentation that flows from the programs? Also, the CAG provided connections
within the Wings and DRGs for further interviews.
Within each Wing/DRG, the first interviews were conducted with senior program
office personnel with program management and engineering responsibilities. These
leaders were a mix of active duty Air Force officers (Majors, Lieutenant Colonels, and
Colonels) and government civilians (GS-13, 14, 15, and SES). These interviews were
intended to provide an overview of the systems architecture work ongoing within the
organization as a whole as well as the senior leader perspective on systems architecting in
general. When systems architecting work was indicated within specific programs within
the organization, follow-up interviews were scheduled with the appropriate programmatic
personnel.
The follow-up interviews concentrated on the specific program application of
systems architecting. Interviews were conducted with program managers, engineers, and
other program office personnel. These interviewees included a wide range of active duty
Air Force officers, government civilians, and support contractors. The focus of this
sampling group was an in-depth review of the program status and any system architecture
work ongoing or planned. This group was also best suited to respond to questions
dealing with education, training, and experience as they represent the “hands-on”
architecture workforce.
Within ASC, three other groups were also interviewed in order to broaden the
scope of the study to encompass the entire organization. First, as part of the ASC
reorganization a Capabilities Planning and Integration Directorate, ASC/XR was stood
up. This organization is intended to be the origin of new system development efforts
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within ASC by coordinating the user’s initial capability requirements with the
appropriate Wing or DRG. Since this group has a program initiation function, they made
likely candidates for architecture work. The next two groups are related in their support
function within ASC. ASC/PM provides education and career management support to
the program managers assigned to ASC, while ASC/EN performs the same function for
the engineering personnel. Both of these organizations had the potential to effect
architectural implementation through their policy and standards and education roles. The
personnel interviewed in these organizations were government civilians in the grades of
GS-13 and above.
Additionally, interviews were conducted with systems architecture and DoDAF
subject matter experts. In the course of reviewing the relevant literature with respect to
systems architectures and the DoDAF, these experts’ names and contact information
became available as resources for data collection. The three experts interviewed were all
government support contractors with vast experience in either systems architecting and/or
the DoDAF, in particular. These interviews (all conducted via e-mail) focused on
gathering expert opinion on the current issues surrounding program office
implementation of the DoDAF systems architecture framework.
3.4 Data Analysis Methodology
This study involves an interpretational analysis methodology. In Leedy, Gall et.
al. describe this process as “examining the data for constructs, themes, and patterns that
can be used to describe and explain the phenomenon studied” (30:158). The
phenomenon, in this case is the implementation of the DoDAF system architecting
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framework within ASC. The data collected provides information enabling “an inductive
process of organizing data into categories and identifying patterns (relationships) among
the categories” (McMillan & Schumacher quoted in 30: 165). Combining these ideas,
the analysis methodology for this study involves grouping like organizations in a threetiered scale in terms of level of architectural implementation and identifying overarching
patterns of behavior with respect to systems architecting. Representative quotes from
interviewees were collected in order to support the characterization of each organization.
The interviews provide data with which to characterize each program, DRG, or
Wing with respect to the level of systems architecting implementation. The organizations
can then be plotted on a continuum representing various levels of systems architecture
implementation. A generic continuum is presented in Figure 7. This continuum will
provide a graphical depiction of the number of organizations in each stage of systems
architecture implementation. This depiction, along with selected quotes and other data to
clarify each organization’s placement on the continuum, should prove and could provide
a baseline for further ASC architecture implementation as well as background for the
development of version 2 of the DoDAF.

No
Architecture
Work In
Organization

Some
Architecture
Work In
Organization

Great Deal of
Architecture
Work In
Organization

Figure 7 Architectural Implementation Continuum
The second portion of the analysis involves recognizing the overall themes and
patterns of systems architecture behavior within ASC. This data is culled from questions
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dealing with the perceived value of systems architectures to acquisition program
management as well as recommendations suggested by interviewees. The results of this
analysis will be presented in verbal form with representative quotes from the
interviewees.
3.5 Validity and Reliability
In a qualitative study such as this, there appears to be no “single, commonly
accepted standard for judging the validity and reliability” (30:168), however this does not
lessen the concerns with respect to ensuring these aspects of the study are maintained at a
high level. Validity deals with the effectiveness of the measure; does it measure what it
is supposed to measure? How comprehensively? How accurately? (30:32). Reliability
deals with the consistency with which a measurement performs. Does the instrument
consistently measure the factors it was designed to? Does it do so accurately (30:35)?
Both issues are addressed below.
In Leedy, Altheide and Johnson refer to four types of ‘interpretive validity’ which
can be used to judge the validity of qualitative research: usefulness, contextual
completeness, research positioning, and reporting style. Usefulness involves the level to
which the study “enlightens those who read it or moves those who were studied to
action”. Contextual completeness deals with how comprehensive the view of the
situation is that is provided. “Research positioning refers to researchers’ awareness of
their own influences (both subtle and direct) in the research setting.” These influences
can include beliefs, values, and/or biases. Finally, the reporting style employed by the
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researcher can have an effect on the study’s overall credibility (30:168). Steps taken to
address each of these issues are described below.
With respect to usefulness, the ultimate determination can only be made some
time after the study. However, as no such study has been attempted previously, the
results will inherently be enlightening to all intended audiences (i.e. the ASC Chief
Architect, DoDAF Working Group, systems engineering community in general). Even if
the results confirm long-held beliefs as to the level of implementation of the architectural
mindset, this study provides data and justification for those beliefs. In terms of driving
organizations to action, this study includes several recommendations in order to address
any deficiencies in architectural implementation within ASC. Again, the final
determination will be made in how many, if any, of the recommendations are followed
through.
Altheide and Johnson recommend the following measures to address contextual
completeness: “including information about the history of the phenomenon; the physical
setting; the activities, schedules, and routines of the participants; as well as their
individual perceptions and meanings” (30:168). This study deals with the issue of
contextual completeness by capturing the evolution of the DoDAF and its expansion
from C4ISR systems to all weapon systems development efforts. Further, the physical
setting in ASC, the activities of the personnel with systems architecture responsibilities,
and their perceptions were captured as part of the data collection process.
The final two characteristics of validity deal with the researcher: the researcher’s
positioning and reporting style. The beliefs, values, and biases of the researcher with
respect to systems architecting and the DoDAF are presented in the Limitations section
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of this chapter. Full disclosure of any issues that may affect the credibility of this study
is the goal. In terms of reporting style, this study is presented with the researcher’s
interpretations of interviewee views as expressed in the interviews conducted. The
overall findings and conclusions (i.e. the analysis) are based on these interpretations;
following a triangulation methodology involving the collection of like statements from
several interviewees, “similar themes are noted in data collected from a variety of
sources” in order to increase credibility in the interpretations (30:169). Where
appropriate, to bolster the weight of the analysis, representative quotes pertaining to the
subject matter are presented. Finally, outlier analysis examined cases that differed
markedly from the majority of situations investigated, identifying what was present or
absent in these cases compared to the more common examples (30:169).
In addition to the triangulation method described above, Cooper identifies a
number of different strategies researchers can employ to increase the reliability of their
research designs (11:6). Specifically, she recommends variety in data collection, which
involves collecting data from a number of different locations or sources (11:12). This
technique is similar to the triangulation method described above and was accomplished
by interviewing personnel with systems engineering (and presumably then, systems
architecture) responsibilities at various organizations within ASC (e.g. Wings, DRGs,
XR, CAG, PM, EN) and at different levels within these organizations. Further, a detailed
literature review pertaining to systems architecture in general, the DoDAF, and systems
architectures within ASC, in particular, provided a variety of additional sources of
information.
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The limitations of this study are common to qualitative studies employed in other
disciplines and are tightly coupled with the researcher’s assumptions. Specifically, the
key limits to the completeness and accuracy of this study are access to the right people,
the researcher’s positioning with respect to the topic of study, and the researcher’s ability
to interpret and correctly portray the true state of systems architecting within ASC. In
terms of interviewee selection, the primary assumption was that starting with the Wing
and DRG commanders and Directors of Engineering, other personnel with systems
architecture responsibilities would be identified. Although this occurred in many cases,
there is a small chance someone with data pertaining to this study was not identified and
therefore not interviewed. With respect to the researcher’s positioning, one assumption
was that most, if not all, organizations within ASC were involved in at least some level of
systems architecture work. This could lead to a limitation in terms of the data collected
in the very first interviews. Finally, the most significant potential limitation results from
not having another research cross check the interview data in order to ensure the
researcher’s ability to correctly analyze the data collected and display the actual state of
affairs such that the reader has the same picture as the researcher.
Assumptions and limitations aside, the documented methodology suits the overall
purpose of this study which is to provide a status of systems architectural implementation
within ASC. The data was collected through numerous interviews and grouped
according to like themes/beliefs. These groupings facilitated analysis of the data to
determine the current state and also trends in systems architecture implementation within
ASC. The analysis leads to the derivation of significant findings and conclusions. This
analysis is described in Chapter 4.
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4. Analysis and Findings
4.1 Overview
Chapter 3 outlined the data collection and analysis methodology. Data was
collected through structured interviews intended to allow the identification of general
groupings of architectural implementation and overall themes within ASC. There are two
types of analysis techniques at work. First, there is the logical grouping of like
organizations/groups on the continuum presented in Figure 7. This grouping facilitated
the second type: descriptions of the groups themselves. Finally, the analysis leads to five
findings of significance, four dealing directly with the research objective and a fifth
having ancillary connection with the topic.
4.2 Logical Grouping Along Implementation Continuum
As outlined in the previous chapter, this continuum provides a glance into the
state of architectural implementation within ASC. Based on similarities in
responses/comments from interviewees, organizations were placed along the continuum
indicating whether they performed “No Architecture Work”, “Some Architecture Work”,
or a “Great Deal of Architecture Work”. The placement of organizations interviewed is
depicted in Figure 8 below. The characteristics that distinguish each group are discussed
in the next section.
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Figure 8 ASC Architecture Implementation Continuum

It is interesting to note that the organizations grouped on the left side of the
continuum, the “No Architecture Work in Organization” section, are the Wings and
Direct Reporting Groups within ASC. However, systems within many of these
organizations are grouped in the middle of the continuum, the “Some Architecture Work
in Organization” section. These groupings are highlighted in Figure 9 below.
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Figure 9 Annotated ASC Architecture Implementation Continuum

In order to further depict this phenomenon, Figure 10 highlights the Long Range Strike
Wing position on the continuum – specifically, to the left, while three of the systems or
sub-organizations within the Wing are placed toward the right side of the continuum.
This indicates that while senior leadership within an organization would respond that, at
least “corporately”, there is little-to-no architecture work ongoing within the
organization, there is indeed some, and in at least this particular case, a great deal of
architecture work in progress. This phenomenon is discussed further in the Findings
sections.
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Figure 10 ASC Corporate Inconsistency in Implementation Reporting

4.3 Characteristics of the Three Groups of Organizations
Within each of the three groups identified in Figure 8, there are similar beliefs
and behaviors that characterize each. These similarities involve the level of
understanding of the value of systems architectures within acquisition programs, the
amount of exposure in terms of training and education in systems architectures, and the
DoDAF in particular, and the different regulatory requirements levied upon them.
Further, organizations/systems grouped within each category also often shared general
acquisition program characteristics such as location in the acquisition development cycle
(i.e. pre-Milestone A, Milestone B, Sustainment, etc.). Each grouping is described below
with a general explanation of the characteristics of the organizations in the group.
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Organizations in the “No Architecture Work” Category
Organizations in “No Architecture Work in Organization” category are most
generally characterized as being legacy platforms operating under existing Operational
Requirements Documents, as opposed to the newer JCIDS and DoD 5000 series
operating instructions. Organizations such as the Long Range Strike Wing with the B-1,
B-2, and B-52, the Fighter Attack Wing with the F-15 and F-16, the Training Group with
the T-1, T-6, and T-38, and the Special Operations Forces Group with their C-130
variants all have systems predominantly in sustainment phase of development. Further,
these programs have capability “roadmaps” in lieu of integrated architectures to address
future development options. Also, the personnel assigned have virtually no training or
experience with the DoDAF.
Organizations in the “Some Architecture Work” Category
Organizations in “No Architecture Work in Organization” category are
characterized by new acquisition policy driving production of architecture views,
architecture products created simply as an output of good systems engineering practice,
and, at least in one case, a Major Command (MAJCOM) emphasis on integrated
architectures. These organizations create architecture products, in most cases, because
they are required to manage information flows. This is perhaps an indication of how
architectures could become a part of the weapon systems acquisition process. Program
office personnel who otherwise may not have taken an interest in the DoDAF will gain
exposure because of necessity. The other two cases, organizations with above average
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systems engineering practices and the MAJCOM driven architecture efforts represent
special cases within this group.
In terms of the new acquisition policies, JCIDS, ISP, and NR-KPP requirements
have lead some organizations to the creation of architecture products. The B-1 Fully
Integrated Data Link, B-2 Radar Modernization Program, and the Personnel Recovery
Vehicle programs all created DoDAF products as a result of an approaching milestone
decision review. In this instance, the views were created by in-house personnel (either
government employees or support contractors) with limited training which included the
DAU Systems Architectures course, SYS 283, training on the Popkin System Architect
tool, and DoDAF training through the Air Force Chief Architect’s office.
A second group driven by regulatory requirements involves programs creating
ISPs and the need to address NR-KPP requirements. The F-16 Link 16 program is facing
testing through the Joint Interoperability Testing Center, which requires the production of
an ISP, which in turn requires the production of architecture products. Further, the C-17
program has taken an even stranger trip to arrive at the need for architecture products.
As a result of a recent Unit Compliance Inspection, the program was found to be lacking
a Program Protection Plan (PPP). The PPP requires an ISP as an annex. And, of course,
the ISP requires several DoDAF views. Although one respondent stated, “In order to
meet these (documentation requirements), you need to understand the architecture”, the
views are predominantly created by contractors as the government personnel had no
exposure to the DoDAF. It is interesting to note that the programs facing a milestone
turned to in-house personnel to create the architecture products, while those facing ISP
requirements outsourced the creation of the documents.
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Two special cases are included in this group: organizations that create
architectures as a part of good systems engineering practice, and organizations working
together with their MAJCOM on integrated architectures. Organizations in the first
category include the Global Mobility Wing, the Joint Strike Fighter avionics
organization, and the F/A-22 program. These organizations are not necessarily driven by
JCIDS, but have been performing systems engineering with a great deal of rigor and
would be able to produce DoDAF products simply as a byproduct. Finally, the other
organization in this category enjoys a relationship with their MAJCOM where the
MAJCOM emphasizes integrated architectures. The Air Mobility Command drives
Global Mobility Wing efforts through architecture products created in their A-6
organization.
Organizations in the “A Great Deal of Architecture Work” Category
Organizations in “Great Deal of Architecture Work in Organization” category are
characterized by an emphasis on future systems/capabilities, having embraced the
benefits of systems architecting, and having personnel with significant experience in
systems engineering, and to some extent, trained in the DoDAF. ASC can be generally
characterized as having many programs that have been in development for a long time
(F-15, B-52, C-130, and even the F/A-22). However, the truly new capabilities and
systems that are coming into ASC for development include the Airborne Electronic
Attack (AEA) capability and the Tanker Modernization Squadron. These
capabilities/systems originate in ASC with the ASC/XR Capabilities Planning
organization. ASC/XR also deploys personnel throughout the Wings and DRGs as
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liaisons for introducing new development efforts. Certainly these organizations have a
regulatory reason to perform system architecting, however, they have also simply
embraced the benefits of systems architecting to acquisitions. They are not alone
however, as the B-2 Group has also bought into the positive aspects of systems
architecting within their organization – and further, the use of the DoDAF. All of the
organizations in this group are characterized by personnel having significant experience
in systems engineering, and to some extent, trained in the DoDAF.
The three groupings and the information underlying the placement of each
organization within the groups lead to five significant findings. The first four relate
directly to the research question and objective – what is the state of DoDAF system
architecture implementation within ASC. The last finding, although not directly
answering the research question, is closely related; dealing with the transition from
system oriented to capability-based weapon system acquisition processes within ASC.
These findings are described below.
4.4 Findings
The data collection and analysis process lead the recognition of five findings:
1. ASC organizations are not doing much architecture work “corporately”.
2. If the organization isn’t developing a new capability or doesn’t have an ‘X’ in
their office symbol, they are not likely doing any architecture work.
3. There is no consensus among ASC personnel as to the benefit of systems
architectures to acquisition program management.
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4. The leadership and organizations attempting to instill an architectural mindset
in ASC programs are not succeeding.
5. The transformation to a capabilities-based weapon system acquisition process
is not complete.
Each finding is detailed below with a general description followed by representative
comments from interviewees.
Finding One: ASC organizations are not doing much architecture work
“corporately”.
Six of the seven Wings/DRGs (or 85.7%) are only doing “Some” or “No”
architecture work. There is no high-level acceptance of system architectures, as indicated
through interviews with the Commander’s Program Execution Group as well as the
senior leaders of each of the Wings and DRGs. Although the senior leaders interviewed
indicated little to no architecture work ongoing, there were cases where organizations or
programs within the corporate organization were creating architecture products due to
regulatory or other requirements (recall the Long Range Strike Wing example in Figure
10). Many organizations are contracting for their architecture development because they
felt the expertise/knowledge/experience is not resident in ASC organically.
Comments representative of this finding include:
- “The Center is not really taking advantage of architectures”.
- “Lack of architecting work has a lot to do with the work and how it gets to
ASC”. That is, in platform chunks via Program Management Directives – the old
acquisition standby: funding and requirements.
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- One interviewee identified the lack of implementation as essentially
“pragmatism”, believing program office personnel have distinct direction
(funding and requirements again), which are difficult enough to achieve without
the additional burden of systems architecting.
- Most of systems engineering work is done by contractors…”we have no one left
in ASC to do it”.
Finding Two: If the organization isn’t developing a new capability or doesn’t
have an ‘X’ in their office symbol, they are not likely doing any architecture
work.
This finding involves two groups – those with an ‘X’ in their office symbol
(ASC/XR and the Wing/DG XR offices) and the rest of ASC. The ‘rest’ of ASC is
predominantly described above in Finding One. The organizations with an ‘X’ in their
office symbol are focused on new capabilities and systems development. However, even
within this group, members still lack the training and experience to use their architecture
products as a systems engineering and capability-based analysis decision-making tool.
Within those who do make use of architectures, there are three groups. The first, group
includes organizations working on new systems and either required to under JCIDS
documentation requirements or see the value added (XRs, new programs like AEA and
Tanker Modernization). The second, and most exclusive group is those who create the
products (or more appropriately, could create the products if required) as a result of
rigorous application of systems engineering practices (Global Recon Wing, etc.). And
finally, the largest group of organizations that make use of architectures are those
directed to (programs/organizations such as the C-17, B-2 RMP, and F-16 Link).
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The organizations making use of the architectures due to seeing the value added
are described in greater detail later in this chapter. Specifically, the AEA, Tanker
Modernization Squadron, and B-2 Group are highlighted as Success Stories. Details
pertaining to these organizations are included later. However, below are representative
comments dealing with the rationale behind the organizations without the ’X’ in their
office symbols are not using architectures.
- “Can’t very well change the architecture of a legacy system”.
- Bottom Line: “Putting these requirements on sustainment systems is a waste”.
- Program managers are too busy putting “rubber on the ramp”.
Finding Three: There is no consensus among ASC personnel as to the benefit
of systems architectures to acquisition program management.

It is clear from the respondents there is no consensus as to the value of systems
architecting within acquisition program offices, at least as far as ASC is concerned.
There are some that see them as a benefit in terms of a tool in the system engineer’s
toolbox. While others believe program offices are not the real users of the architecture
products. Still others believe the products and process are too complex. Finally, there
are many who believe there are issues with the products themselves.
For those who see system architectures as a benefit in terms of as a tool in the
system engineer’s toolbox, representative comments include:
- Architectures are a good communications tool to HQ (the people who integrate
systems).
- The Systems and Technical Views are what provide value to program offices.

57

- The TV-1 is an important product that establishes the standards with which the
rest of development work will be based upon.
- These products would really benefit complicated commands like Air Combat
Command and Special Operations Command, where complex interactions and
connectivity are the norm.
The organizations who believe program offices are not the users of the
architecture products, had this to say:
- The concept (systems architectures) exists at an Air Force level such that it has
not resulted in funding and requirements outside platforms. In other words, the
program offices are given a program to execute and the architectures should be
included when the acquisition effort starts.
- A lot of this stuff is “too high level”.
- There is “No advocacy at worker-bee level in SPO for architectures”.
- Acquisition personnel need good examples; a “poster child”.
The third sub-finding dealing with a lack of consensus within ASC revolves
around a belief that the products and process of systems architecting are too complex.
Comments in support of this belief include:
- Architecture products are “Complex, time-consuming, and expensive”.
- They are “labor and intellect-intensive matters”.
- There is a danger in creating something so “cumbersome” that it is too abstract
in the mainstream of the management of the program.
And the final sub-finding in this area deals with what respondents consider issues
with the DoDAF products themselves. Representative comments include:
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- The “views are not well defined”.
- “See a lot of people running around creating products that are not really
integrated”.
- Many products lack description of timing and latency.
- We need a consistent approach for the implementation of the views into the
modeling and simulation environments. Specifically, they need to be translated
into dynamic system-of-system operations research models and we have to be
able to tie OVs & SVs together into an executable models that are good for
management and operational assessments (trade-offs, impacts, what ifs, etc.).
Finding Four: The leadership and organizations attempting to instill an
architectural mindset are not succeeding.

This finding deals with attempts by the leadership and organizations who are
attempting to instill an architectural mindset. According to the interviewees, these
organizations and leaders are not succeeding. Comments in support of this assessment
include:
- “Death by viewgraph” or, “in the ether frequently”. There is a belief that these
organizations are really good at putting together Power Point presentations, but
that the material is over the audiences heads.
- With respect to the position of ASC Chief Architect; most interviewees didn’t
know who the Chief Architect was – and, in some cases, that ASC even had one.
- The ASC/XR (Capabilities Planning Division) plays a leading role in
capabilities-based analysis and planning (with architectural pieces to both), but
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interviewees believed they may not have ability to do what we need to have done
with respect to systems of systems development planning; specifically the trades,
etc. that keep the product center from getting user-directed solutions.
- Finally, the ASC Program Management home office, ASC/PM and the ASC
Engineering home office, ASC/EN, have responsibilities to train and equip the
program managers and engineers that populate the program offices. With respect
to systems architectures, there is no formal training program for program
managers and engineers.
-- Engineers can volunteer for a systems engineering certification program
through the Air Force Institute of Technology that includes a course on
systems architecting. However, they self-nominate themselves (i.e. there
is no selection and nomination process), there are no positions within ASC
that are identified as requiring this certification, and, at least in the past
year (2004), there were only four engineers participating in the program.
Finding Five: The transformation to a capabilities-based weapon system
acquisition process is not complete.
The previous four findings dealt directly with the research topic of investigating
the state of systems architecting within ASC. This last finding, although no less
significant in terms of voracity (as it was apparent from the number of interviewees who
shared this belief that it was worth reporting), does not tie directly into the research
objective. It deals with the adoption of a capability-based acquisition process within
ASC. This shift from requirements- and platform-based acquisition is fundamental to the
new JCIDS process and therefore subject to similar growing pains in terms of integration
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into the standard mode of operation as is systems architectures. Indeed the two concepts
appear to be following similar paths, at least up to this point within ASC. Comments that
elucidate this finding are below.
- “I have a user that doesn’t know what a capability is – they want a system”.
- Net-centricity and capabilities-based development has not found its way into the
infrastructure.
- With respect to the notion of a ‘Capability Manager (CM)’ where the CM
allocates requirement to system; system responsible to make trade-offs to meet
multiple capabilities; some thought that this was a dangerous concept if they are
not responsible to deliver anything.
- Also, there was concern about the way we manage capabilities/programs?
-- Bottom-Up (systems perspective) to fill capability gaps, or
-- Top-Down (capabilities-wise) with multiple systems to meet capability
needs?
These findings represent the complete results of the analysis performed of the
data collected during this study. Four of the findings provide direct support for
answering the research questions, while the fifth provides useful commentary on an
ancillary and related topic. Although the tone of the findings presented indicated a lack
of architecture work within the product center, there are some who are making it work.
Specifically, the AEA, B-2 Group, and Tanker Modernization Squadrons would have to
be considered success stories in terms of adopting systems architecture, and the DoDAF
mindset.
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4.5 Success Stories
While collecting data for this study, three organizations stood out as having
successfully applied systems architecture within their sphere of weapon system
development. These organizations arrived at their acceptance of architectures, and the
DoDAF, in different manners, but all represent the leading edge in terms of architectural
integration. AEA is a capability that is being managed as such. The Capability Manager
believes systems architectures are vital to the success of a capability management effort.
The B-2 Group first encountered architectures as part of a milestone preparation exercise
for the Radar Modernization Program, but have since found the DoDAF to be a continued
useful tool. Finally, the Tanker Modernization Squadron also started off without the aid
of system architectures, but eventually was directed to take a capability delivery
approach. Each of these is discussed further.
Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA)
As mentioned above, AEA is not a single program, but rather a capability. At this
point, the organization is ‘prototyping’ the Capability Management concept. The AEA
Capability Manager (CM) actually has his own Program Element which allows control of
the funding for all aspects of providing this capability. The CM provides funding and
requirements to the appropriate Wings/DRGs. The AEA capability is intended to provide
support to strike forces, initially in a high threat/limited access environment. The AEA
architecture contains multiple systems including the B-52, E-18, and the Joint Unmanned
Combat Aerial System (J-UCAS). In fact, the CM believes that “architectures are key to
successful capability management”.

62

B-2 Group
The B-2 Group within the Long Range Strike Wing took a unique path to full
systems architecture acceptance. Initially the B-2 Group faced a Milestone B decision
for the B-2 Radar Modernization Program (RMP). Since Milestone B requires the
creation of a CDD, the program office was required to create architecture views.
However, during the effort of creating the products for the CDD, the effort blossomed
into a B-2 enterprise-wide architecture effort.
The program office personnel realized the value to the program of adopting
architectural methodology, and specifically believed it would be faster to do it right
(following DoDAF) than to fight it --- and their key is speed. The Group sees
architectures as a “lingua franca to go from operational requirements to systems
specifications” and maintain information consistency. They hope to develop a consistent
lexicon of speech from requirements through implementation. Another positive aspect of
the B-2 Group’s architectural implementation is their cooperation with the MAJCOM
customer. They are working hand-in-hand with ACC/DRA2 (the B-2 requirements
office), who buys in to the value of architectures as well.
Tanker Modernization Squadron
The Tanker Modernization Squadron within the Global Mobility Wing is a preMilestone B capability development organization looking into replacing the aging fleet of
KC-135 air refueling aircraft. This effort began originally as KC-767 Program (the
infamous) Tanker Lease program. At the early stages, any architecture work completed
by the people in the program was essentially “square-filling”. However, when the
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program was “paused” for political reasons, the program office regrouped and began
looking at the requirement from a capability perspective. They were initially driven to
architectures by interoperability and information assurance concerns, but have embraced
architectures as a capability development tool. Just as the B-2 Group, the Tanker
Modernization Squadron is doing it right – working with the MAJCOM on capabilitybased development; AMC has contracted for the development of the Tanker-X CDD.
Both the MAJCOM and the Tanker Modernization Squadron believe this early
involvement, coupled with the use of systems architectures, provides an “opportunity to
get on top of requirements generation process.”
These three organizations, along with the XR organizations represent the cutting
edge of architectural implementation within ASC. They represent the exception,
however, not the rule. As mentioned earlier, 87% of the Wings/DRGs reported only
some or no architecture work. The data collected in this study lead to the additional
findings that there is no consensus within ASC on the value of systems architecting and
the leadership attempting to incorporate architectures into ASC acquisitions is not
succeeding. Further, the interviewees indicated an additional finding concerning the
slow pace of the transformation to effective capabilities-based acquisition. The JCIDS
process is intended to create this process, and systems architectures are intended to aid in
the execution of this process. Unfortunately at this point, despite the regulatory
requirements to create architecture products, the program managers and engineers within
ASC are not reaping the intended benefits of systems architectures within their programs.
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5. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Overview
This study examined the level to which ASC has implemented systems
architectures within their weapon systems development efforts. The literature indicates
there are real benefits to be had for acquisition program office personnel. In addition,
guidance has been instituted calling for the use of system architectures, specifically the
DoDAF products. Despite the benefits and the guidance, there are roadblocks to the
successful implementation within ASC. Based on a robust data collection and analysis
methodology, five critical findings were identified. These findings provide the
justification for the two conclusions outlined below.
5.2 Conclusions
Recall the specific research question this study set out to answer, How are
systems architectures, and the DoDAF specifically, being implemented “in the trenches”
of USAF weapons systems acquisitions? This study focused the investigation in
answering this question on ASC. The data collected point to two conclusions.
1. While programs required to follow new acquisition processes are doing so,
very few are employing systems architectures systematically.
2. At this point, at least within ASC, the benefits derived from an
architectural context are not yet being realized.

5.3 Recommendations
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The findings provide evidence for the following recommendations offered in
satisfaction of the research objective. There are recommendations for ASC, for the
DoDAF Working Group, and for the systems engineering community in general.
Ultimately, these groups should determine the goal of incorporating systems architectures
within weapon systems acquisitions and the follow-up with a level of commitment to
back up the decision.
1. Lead by the ASC Chief Architect, ASC leadership should clearly
determine goals for systems architecting. For instance, if it is a valuable tool that
every Wing and DRG should have in their toolkit, then the Chief Architect should come
up with architecture standards and then publicize/indoctrinate the program managers and
engineers within the center. And the chief engineers within each Wing and DRG
(spearheaded by ASC/EN) should take lead in developing architectural mindset within
organization. These organizations should also act as conduit to make the high-level
(often esoteric) guidance relevant to program office personnel concerned with
cost/schedule/performance.
2. The ASC architectural leadership should select an exemplar case as a
practical example of how systems architectures can be applied to capability
management. This would provide other program offices the example many are
clamoring for. Further, a more comprehensive training program should be instituted
within the center starting at the “See Dick create an architecture” level. Several training
opportunities already exist: AFIT SENG 640 course, DAU SYS 283 course, Aerospace
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Corporation Systems Arch. Course, etc. The leadership should continue the current
practice of using ASC Focus Week as means of “getting the word out”.
3. The Architecture Working Group (AWG) should incorporate these
findings to improve DoDAF Version 2.0 products in support of capabilities-based
acquisition. The data collected and presented in this study are intended to aid them in
making the DoDAF more of a tool for acquisition program office personnel. One
imperative is for the AWG to make the case for architectures as systems engineering and
program management tool. Capture the examples of successful implementation, AEA/B2/Tanker Replacement within ASC – but also any others from other product centers or
services for that matter, as case studies with practical examples for others to follow.
Together with the systems engineering community in general, find some way to address
issues raised in Finding #3 above concerning the products themselves; timing and
latency, how to address complex, dynamic systems/capabilities with static views.
4. The systems engineering community (SAF/AQ, ASC/EN, Chief Engineers,
CSE, OSD/OSSE) should also develop/integrate a syntax and methodology for
DoDAF views to be made executable. This effort should be more than just to determine
if the architectures will work, but to allow for the development of measures of
performance in order to compare architectures to one another for tradeoff purposes. It is
this ability, to dynamically simulate a proposed architecture and evaluate the measures of
effectiveness output, which provides the ultimate value to capability-based weapon
systems acquisition efforts.
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5.4 Recommendations for Further Study
During the course of this study, several additional areas of interest were
identified, where further study could be of value to decision-makers. An obvious
extension of this study is to evaluate the other Air Force product centers – and even
investigate the state of architectural implementation within the other services acquisition
programs. As previously mentioned, the success stories within ASC should be studied in
greater detail in order to produce case studies that could serve as justification for the
skeptical and a notional ‘how-to’ for those looking for an example to follow. Also a
recurring theme throughout this study is the call for executable architectures. Efforts
should be made in the engineering and research communities to develop techniques for
the dynamic analysis of architectural products. Two additional recommended areas of
study are capability management as a construct and the Air Force Materiel Command
reorganization. Both areas are in their infancy, in that they are recent changes to the way
of doing business, however careful study as these concepts mature would benefit Air
Force acquisitions.
The first recommendation, in terms of additional study, is to reproduce this study
at other product centers to determine if ASC is out front of the systems architecture
implementation curve. How are the other centers, Air Armament Center (AAC),
Electronic Systems Center (ESC), and Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) coming
along in their implementation of systems architectures within acquisition program
management? It would seem notionally that ESC would be in front due to their exposure
to the CAF since 1996, but is that the case? Also, SMC follows the space-specific
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guidance of the NSS 03-01, which calls for architecture products as part of process; but
how are they doing?
The acquisition community would greatly benefit from case studies documenting
successful lessons learned concerning system architectures. Specifically, an AEA
Capability Management Case Study would have value no matter how successful this
foray into capability management is. If it works and the capability is delivered to the
warfighter in a timely and cost-effective manner, this could be a model for other
“capability management” scenarios to follow. If it doesn’t work, then the focus of the
case study could be “how could such a seemingly good idea fail?” In either case, the
DoD is moving towards a capability-based development system, and as the Air Force’s
first true capability management effort, AEA bears close study.
The need to evaluate methods to make the DoDAF views executable has been
identified repeatedly in this study. There are tools, such as VITECH’s CORE that allow
the system engineer to “run” the architecture. However, at this point, this analysis only
provides the answer to the question, “does the architecture modeled work”? This is truly
an important question, as it is much better to find that the design is missing key
interactions in a modeling arena as opposed to when you have built hardware and are
testing. The next step, however is the ability to measure how well each architecture
performs, not just that it works.
Closely related to the study of the AEA capability management effort would be to
further explore the idea of Capability Management altogether. For instance, what exactly
constitutes capability management? What differentiates between program management
and capability management competencies? Further, who are capability managers; what
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training/experience/knowledge are required? Where do they fit organizationally (product
center, AFMC headquarters, MAJCOMs, USAF CONOPs)? What about funding and
control of schedules to synchronize capability releases? This is an area ripe for study.
Perhaps investigating how similar efforts are done in industry.
–

The final recommendation for additional study would be to evaluate the

effectiveness of AFMC reorganization. This is a recent change to how AFMC does
business and was done to accomplish specific goals. The study could be a case study
investigating the pros and cons of Wing/Group/Squadron organization, measuring
progress against the stated goals of the reorganization effort. Does this structure really
make it easier to relate to customer? Does the new structure increase cross-enterprise
integration? ASC is the first product center to implement this reorganization, but the
other AFMC product centers are also reorganizing this way.
ASC is, as part of the overall DoD acquisition transformation effort, in a period of
change. The aim is for a more top-down, capabilities-based weapon system process
where all services developed by each service interact to produce the effects combatant
commanders require to meet the national security objectives. The DoDAF provides a
proposed framework for the development of architectural products in support of the kind
of analysis required to make this vision happen. However, at least at this point in ASC,
the architectures have not been integrated into the everyday operations of the acquisition
program office personnel charged with managing the development of new capabilities.
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